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In theory, federal transfers that make household location decisions efficient should ignore local cost
differences, subsidize positive externalities, and offset differences in federal-tax payments and local
taxes levied on non-residents, but not local tax revenues from residents. Transfers that redistribute
resources equitably across regions will likely target areas with individuals of low earnings potential
or low real incomes. Applying these criteria empirically, Canadian equalization policy appears neither
efficient nor equitable, but exacerbates pre-existing inefficiencies and underfunds minorities. Locational
inefficiencies cost Canada 0.41 percent of income annually and cause over-funded provinces to have
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Many federal governments – including those of Canada, Germany, Australia, and Japan – make
ﬁscal equalization payments to local governments, with the stated goal of equalizing the ﬁscal
capacity of local governments to provide public services. Most equalization systems provide un-
conditional grants that are negatively related to an estimate of local ﬁscal capacity. Often, this
measure of ﬁscal capacity is a weighted average of local tax bases, where the weight of each base
is determined by its representative share of revenue across all localities. These weights are gen-
erally independent of whether the tax has a source or residence base – i.e., levied on incomes
earned locally or received locally. For example, corporate income taxes, which may be paid by
non-residents, are treated the same as personal income taxes, paid only by residents.
The merits of equalization systems have been hotly debated by economists such as Buchanan
(1950, 1951, 1952), Scott (1950, 1952), Jenkins (1951), Musgrave (1961), Feldstein (1970),
Courchene (1981), Ladd and Yinger (1994), Oakland (1994), and Usher (2007). These debates
typically focus on how equalization may aid or impede efﬁcient migration, or may steer public
resources more equitably towards needy communities. Such discussions are closely tied to those
on similar place-based policies (e.g. Gottlieb and Glaeser 2008; Busso et al. 2010) that are of great
interest to the European Union, the United States, and other countries.
In this paper, I clarify these debates using a theoretical framework similar to those in the pre-
vious literature, with mobile heterogeneous households who live, work, and consume local public
services in the same region. Unlike inﬂuential work by Buchanan (1950) and Boadway and Flatters
(1982a), I argue this framework only supports the equalization of source, and not residence, -based
revenues. In addition, I expand the traditional framework to incorporate federal taxes, residential
land, and inter-regional differences in amenities and private and public productivity. This expanded
framework establishes that it is efﬁcient for federal grants to ignore differences in local costs, but
to refund higher federal-tax payments caused by higher local wage levels. The framework also
provides a richer context for how grants may be distributed to promote equity goals, expanding on
Buchanan (1950), who compares households based on their realized nominal incomes. Instead, I
1argue that it is more sensible to compare households on their realized real incomes, adjusted for
local costs-of-living, or the potential incomes they would earn if they lived in the same region.
The expanded framework is also empirically compatible with observed inter-regional differ-
ences in wages, costs-of-living, and population. Therefore, it allows researchers to use real-world
data to evaluate whether existing equalization systems are efﬁcient or equitable based on the cri-
teria presented here. I perform such an evaluation of Canada’s equalization system. Over recent
history, the highest per-capita equalization payments were paid to the Atlantic provinces – New-
foundland, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick – and to two Prairie provinces,
Manitoba and Saskatchewan. As these six provinces are not deﬁcient in source-based revenues and
also low federal-tax burdens, these payments create inefﬁcient incentives for Canadians to move
to these provinces. Alberta, the remaining Prairie province, collects large source-based revenues
from oil and other resources, which the federal government does not redistribute these revenues
through asymmetry in its formula. These enormous revenues also create inefﬁcient incentives to
move, as they are offered only to those who reside within Alberta’s borders. According to simula-
tions below, the failure of equalization policy to eliminate ﬁscal imbalances causes the Atlantic and
Prairie provinces to be populated by 31 percent beyond their efﬁcient levels, leading to inefﬁciency
costs of 0.41 percent of income, or C$4.3 billion per year. Furthermore, grants and other local ben-
eﬁts do not appear to be equitably targeted, as they go disproportionately towards provinces where
workers are well-skilled and real incomes are high.
Section 2 presents the theoretical model used to determine efﬁcient grant levels and section 3
discusses equity criteria in greater detail. The measurable net ﬁscal beneﬁts of residing in each
Canadian province are calculated in section 4, which involves estimating how much provincial
wagedifferencesareduetolocationortoworkercharacteristics. Section5examinestheexternality
and equity justiﬁcations for net ﬁscal beneﬁt differences empirically. The long-run effects of ﬁscal
distortions on provincial price levels, wages, employment and welfare are simulated in section 6.
The Appendix contains many interesting details on the theory and data.
22 Federal Location Model with Grants
2.1 Model Set-Up
Here, I model a competitive economy with heterogeneous households who are mobile across ju-
risdictions, with governments that provide a local good. This follows the mainstream literature on
ﬁscal federalism by Flatters, Henderson and Mieszkowski, (1974), Stiglitz (1977), Boadway and
Flatters (1982a), Wildasin (1980, 1986), and Mieszkowski and Zodrow (1989). For empirical vi-
ability, I expand the theoretical framework to incorporate regional differences in productivity and
quality of life, as in Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982), and federal taxes, as in Albouy (2009a).
The framework here resembles that of Albouy, Leibovici, and Warman (2012) – who use wage and
cost-of-living data to estimate productivity and quality-of-life differences across Canadian cities –
except that it incorporates local public sectors that vary in productivity, similar to Yinger (1986).
HouseholdseachsupplyoneunitoflaborandbelongtooneofE types, indexedbye = 1;:::;E,
where types may characterize skills or tastes. The number of households of each type is ﬁxed in
the federation. Households may locate in any of J regions, j = 1;:::;J, where they live and work;
intra-regional issues are not considered. The population composition of region j is described by




E), using the scalar Nj =
P
e Nj
e for region j’s total population.







which depends on three goods: (i) a tradable private good, x, (ii) a non-tradable (home) private
good, y, and (iii) a non-tradable publicly-provided good (or public service), gj = Gj(Nj)￿￿. Gj is
the aggregate level of public production, which is congested according to the parameter ￿ 2 [0;1]:
￿ = 0 corresponds to a pure public good, and ￿ = 1, a publicly-provided private good. Private
consumption bundles in region j may vary by type e, but Gj, is uniformly provided across all types
within the population, and each individual contributes equally to congesting it, although tastes for
3gj may differ. The local public sector does not provide services to capital or ﬁrms.
Each location j is characterized by exogenous levels of (i) quality of life, Qj, determined
by consumption amenities; (ii) productivity in the tradable sector, A
j
X; (iii) productivity in the
non-tradable sector, A
j
Y; (iv) productivity in the public sector, A
j
G; and (v) land supply, Lj. All
ﬁnal goods are produced from land, labor, and mobile capital, Kj. Factor markets are perfectly
competitive and factors are fully mobile within each region, and so command the same regional
price in all sectors, including the public sector.1 Land is immobile across regions and earns a local
price rj. Capital is fully mobile across regions and earns a gross price ij: the national supply of
capital may be ﬁxed or determined internationally. Each household type owns a portfolio of capital
and land, which earn incomes Ie and Re that do not depend on where the individual lives.
Households are fully mobile across regions and earn the local wage wj
e, which varies to com-
pensate workers for differences in cost-of-living due to p
j
Y, quality of life, Qj, and the local-
government good, gj. In equilibrium, regions with a high quality of life, Qj, or public-productivity,
A
j
G, have local costs that are high relative to local wage levels. Thus, lower wage levels compensate





Y, should have wage and cost-levels that are high relative to
output prices, either 1 or p
j
Y, as the ratio of input to output prices reﬂect the marginal productivity
of those inputs.2 As described in Albouy (2009b), the degree to which local wages and prices capi-
talize these different attributes depends on the proportions of land and labor in tradable production,
and federal-tax rates. The results below apply regardless of these capitalization effects.3
To pay for local-government goods, local governments levy linear taxes.4 Source (or origin)
1Results would not change signiﬁcantly if another ﬁxed factor used only in the production sector, such as natural
resource reserve, is introduced. Land may also proxy for capital that is immobile.
2If multiple output goods are produced then it seems possible that factor-price equalization will force factor prices
to converge across areas. However, productivity differences should still lead to higher wages for workers in more
productive areas. With free mobility, cities differing in amenities are likely to specialize in the production of a subset
of goods, putting them outside of the cone of diversiﬁcation in which factor-price equalization holds.
3Note that the Boadway and Flatters (1982) model has no non-tradable sector and only allows areas to differ in
land supply. As a result, provinces with more land have greater population and provision of Gj, which causes them to
have lower wages. This makes the model empirically unworkable, as wage levels are higher in more populated areas,
and vary for many other reasons.
4Linear taxes are without loss of generality as progressive tax ratesl lead to similar conclusions. Whether tax rates
are set endogenously is not important to the locational distortions modeled here. Inefﬁciencies in local public-sector




K. Residence (or destination) -based





I. The budget constraint































eRe, and ￿ Ij = (1=Nj)
P
e Nj
eIe are the per-capita values of the three residence bases,
labor, rents, and interest. Following standard assumptions, local governments pay factors their
marginal product and produce and allocate Gj efﬁciently, so that it obeys the following Samuelson












Gx are the average marginal rates of substitution and transformation between
the local-government good and the private tradable good. The condition reﬂects the intuition
that households decide locally how to allocate resources between private and public consump-
tion. Thus, it is for local, not federal, agents to decide between buying, say, a better car or a better
roadway. As ￿ increases, (2) resembles more the condition for the efﬁcient provision of private
goods than for pure public goods. Notice that it applies regardless of cost differences due to factor
prices or public-productivity, A
j
G.5
The federal government levies taxes ￿F
w, ￿F
R, and ￿F
I to raise revenue. Besides making its own
purchases, valued at GF, the federal government provides transfers, or grants, to individuals, F j
e,
based upon their type e and region j.6 The signs of F j
e are not restricted: a negative value repre-
spending policies or taxes may have an effect on the quality of life or public or private productivity of the community.
5Condition (2) generally rules out the case where G is provided equally across areas, e.g. Gj = ￿ G. This could lead
to inefﬁciently high or low levels of public consumption in different areas. The results below are largely unaffected if
local governments tax or provide Gj inefﬁciently, as this is usually equivalent to lowering A
j
G or Qj
6GF may enter the utility function, but since it beneﬁts all households equally, there is no purpose in modelling it.
This may be violated if, for instance, households on the coasts beneﬁt more from national defense than those in the
interior.
5sents a non-distortionary head tax. Having grants target individuals rather than local governments
follows the previous literature, and allows the federal government to attain "ﬁrst-best" efﬁcient al-
locations. An interesting "second-best" scenario would occur when regional grants are ﬁxed across
types, i.e., F j
e = F
j
e0, for each j and all e. This is a more difﬁcult problem better-suited for future
research, although below I consider how results are affected when payments are made to local
































2.2 Efﬁcient Transfer Policy to Households across Regions
From the above set up, Appendix A derives the set of Pareto efﬁcient transfers, using the solution
from a benevolent planner’s problem. The solution provides conditions that characterize efﬁcient
levels of population, production, and consumption across regions. These conditions combine with
market conditions – describing efﬁcient prices, household and government budget constraints, and
the like – to determine efﬁcient transfer levels to each household type e by location j.
The planner’s problem assumes that households are fully mobile. Each household type receives
the same utility regardless of where it resides, but utility varies across types. Thus, a regional
planner would enact the same efﬁcient transfers as a federal planner (Myers 1990). It is most
reasonable to assume that populations are mobile in a long-run setting: when mobility costs are
amortizedoverlongertimeperiods, theybecomesmallrelativetothepotentialgainsfrommoving.8
According to the planner’s problem, households are located efﬁciently if the following ﬁrst-
7Considerations such as the "ﬂypaper effect" are ignored in the treatment here, as the subject of this research is on
efﬁcientlocation decisions, notpublic-service provision. Inaddition, thistreatment doesnot considerhow equalization
programs affect the incentives of local governments in raising revenues; see Smart (1998).
8The conclusions below may hold even when some households are immobile, so long as there is a sufﬁciently large
number of mobile households of each type.



















e > 0 (4)
The ﬁrst term on the left is the marginal productivity of labor in tradable goods, the second and
third reﬂect the resource cost of private consumption, and the last, the resource cost of public
consumption through congestion effects. On the right is a type-speciﬁc Lagrange multiplier, which
decreases in the implicit weight type e would receive in a compatible social welfare function.
Condition (4) implies that is efﬁcient for households to locate where their labor productivity is
high relative to the resource cost they need to achieve a nationally-determined level of utility. This
resource cost may differ, as households need fewer resources where quality of life is high.
The efﬁcient federal transfer for type e in region j, denoted F j￿
e is characterized by the follow-























Nj + Fe; if N
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e is the average wage of type e across locations; T j
e is the average
residence-based tax paid by type e in location j.9 Each term in (5) requires explanation:
1. Federal-tax differential. The term ￿F
w(wj
e ￿ ￿ wF
e ) is the federal tax that a household of
type e in region j pays relative to the national average for type e. It can be positive or
negative, and encourages workers to locate in low-wage areas, as this lowers their federal-
tax burdens without lowering their federal beneﬁts, presumably from GF. Federal grants
can undo this effect by increasing beneﬁts to highly-taxed areas. This term isolates the
dependence of a household’s income on its location, apart from its type. Thus, efﬁcient
grants undo redistribution across identical households in different regions.




9This condition characterizes efﬁciency assuming that there are no other distortions in the economy. Most impor-
tantly, capital tax rates ￿
j
K must be equal across regions for this equation to hold exactly.
7(1949) "ﬁscal residuum" and equal to the cost of residence-based taxes borne by type e mi-
nus the average per-capita cost. These should be set to zero so that local residence-based
taxes exactly reﬂect local costs, and there is only one local tax price for residing in region j.
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The ﬁrst right-hand term in (6), in brackets, breaks down the residence-based taxes paid
by type e relative to the average local resident. Individuals paying more than the average
should have excess taxes refunded to them by the federal government, insuring that local
taxes operate as user fees. Because households are perfectly mobile, any local attempts at
income redistribution are inefﬁcient and are undone by efﬁcient transfers. The second term
in (6) expresses that local source-based revenues, whether on mobile (capital) or immobile
(land) factors, need to be taxed away and redistributed nationally. Otherwise, households
have distorted incentives to live in areas where valuable land and capital is taxed.10
3. Public-good externality, (1 ￿ ￿)p
j
GGj=Nj is the net externality that members of region j
receive from a migrant arrives. It results from the non-rivalness of the public good when





GGj=Nj in resources. An efﬁcient transfer internalizes this externality
with a subsidy proportional to per-capita public expenditures (Buchanan and Goetz 1972).
Mostempiricalestimatesof￿areclosetoone(e.g. BergstromandGoodman1973), meaning
this externality is likely small, although Oates (1988) argues that these estimates of ￿ are
biased upwards.11
10It may be efﬁcient to tax capital and particularly land, but the revenues from these taxes need to be distributed
equally across regions to prevent inefﬁcient migration. Some may see publicly redistributing oil revenues locally
as compensation for negative local externalities associated with oil drilling. Compensating payments of this kind
counteract the correct incentives to live away from polluted areas. It is inefﬁcient to pay households yearly to live
on top of a toxic waste dump as it encourages them to live there. It is more sensible to make a one-time payment to
households on a waste dump when it opens, and not penalize them for moving away.
11Oates’ critique applies to estimates of ￿ based on the elasticity of pGG to community size N. Demand for local
goods may increase with N, as larger communites may exploit economies of scale for certain hard-to-divide public
84. Location-independent transfer: Fe is a lump-sum transfer to households of type e, regard-
less of where they live. This term accomplishes redistributive goals federally: the greater
utility type e receives nationally, the higher is Fe. Since there is an Fe for each type, the
federal government can achieve any feasible distribution of utilities, precluding inefﬁcient
local redistribution.
The federal transfer, F j
e minus the ﬁrst three terms in (5) reﬂect the total net ﬁscal beneﬁts, or
NFB, of residing in region j for type e: Differences in these NFBs across regions distort migration
incentives, and thus efﬁcient transfer policy may negate these differences by setting F j
e so that the
NFB facing individual households are the same across regions.
The transfer formula implies that is inefﬁcient to subsidize mobile households to live where ei-




G appear in (5) independently
of total expenditures p
j
GGj, which matters only for the public-good externality. Thus variation in
these prices due either to factor costs or production efﬁciency are to be ignored.
















Nj + ￿ F
j
e (7)




e is the average wage level in region j that would prevail at the




eFe is the average location-independent grant by
type. The key result from this aggregation is that the residence-based tax terms in (6) add up to
zero, as discussed below.12
goods, such as zoos. This implies that expenditures may rise quickly with population size, even when congestion is
low, as communities increase the number of subfunctions of local government.
12A version of the "Henry George Theorem" (Stiglitz 1977) applies when ￿ = 0; ￿F
w = ￿
j
K = 0 and ￿
j
L = 1, in
which case p
j
GGj = rjLj+Nj( ￿ Fj￿￿ ￿ Fj
e). When local public expenditures equal local land values, net ﬁscal beneﬁts
are zero, and location decisions are efﬁcient.
92.3 Relationship to the Existing Literature
The analysis above is the ﬁrst to consider how federal transfers may offset location distortions
caused by higher federal-tax burdens in higher-wage areas, which are examined in Hochman and
Pines (1993) and Albouy (2009a).13 Without such offsets, indexing transfers to local costs may be
efﬁciency improving if these costs are strongly correlated with local wage levels, as they often are.
Otherwise, it is efﬁcient for transfers to ignore differences in local costs, both private and public.
This does not preclude higher transfers to areas with needier households, e.g., with many special-
needs children, but this is handled through the location-independent transfer, Fe. Hopefully, these
insights should clarify the debate for and (e.g. Ladd and Yinger 1994, Reschovsky 1994) and
against (e.g. Oakland 1994, Glaeser 1998) indexing transfers to local costs.
The literature establishes that it is generally efﬁcient and equitable for federal governments to
equalizedifferencesinﬁscalcapacityfromsourcebases(Usher1977; BoadwayandFlatters1982a;
Mieszkowski and Toder 1983; Mckenzie 2006), unless these taxes fund services to the factors they
are levied on. The case for equalizing differences in residence bases has been less clear. In the
Tiebout (1956) model, equalization policy breaks the Wicksellian link between residence taxes and
local beneﬁts, causing households to locate inefﬁciently. However, this model requires households
to sort perfectly into communities so that each pays the same tax, which seems inapplicable to
large jurisdictions, where labor markets tie different households types together.
Without perfect sorting, Buchanan (1950) and Boadway and Flatters (1982a) conclude that
equalizing differences in residence-based tax capacities prevents inefﬁcient migration towards
high-income communities. This conclusion appears widely accepted in the academic and policy
literature on ﬁscal federalism (see Inman and Rubinfeld 1997; Musgrave 1997; Boadway 2004). It
is based on the observation that the efﬁcient transfer formula, seen through (5) and (6), is decreas-
ing in the average income level, ￿ wj + ￿ Ij+ ￿ Rj. The intuition is that all households want to move to
areas with richer types, who contribute greatly to local public services.
13Poschmann (1998) also considers provincial inequalities in federal taxation, but he does not distinguish amounts
due to differences in local wage levels apart from differences in local worker composition.
10Yet, the corrective transfers needed to turn residence-based taxes into pure beneﬁt taxes average
out to zero in (7) since each correction depends on household deviations from the local average.
Locally, the poor are taxed and the rich are subsidized in equal amounts to obtain efﬁcient pop-
ulation levels. In areas with richer types, ﬁscal residua are eliminated by imposing higher taxes
on the poor, and giving smaller subsidies to the rich. Subsidizing households to live in areas with
poorer types overcrowds these areas. Penalizing areas that collect greater revenues from richer
types causes richer types to inefﬁciently seek out areas where tax rates and public services are low.
Buchanan’s reasoning is consistent with (7) but produces interregional transfers because he
requires the location-independent transfers, Fe, to be set so that transfers produce no net redis-








GGj=Nj: Since poorer types pay corrective taxes, they need to be refunded more through Fe,
implying that areas with more poor types receive a higher ￿ F j
e. But this refunding is unnecessary, as
ﬁrst explained by Jenkins (1951). Other rules may be set to make grants more or less redistributive,
without hindering efﬁciency. In an example with two types and two regions, Boadway and Flatters




2, although this constraint is generally incompatible with (5)
when there are more than two regions and types.14
14In Buchanan’s (1950) example j 2 fA;Bg and e 2 fs;ug where s is skilled and u is unskilled, all income is
from labor wA
s = wB
s = 10000, wA
u = wB




u = (2;1;1;2), with ￿A
w = ￿B
w = 0:1. No




u ) = (Fs +300;Fu ￿600;Fs +
600;Fu ￿300) where Fs and Fu are unspeciﬁed, implying aggregate transfers to region A and region B should differ
by Fu ￿ Fs. In the name of equity, Buchanan imposes the rule that no transfers are made across types, meaning P
j Nj
eFj




u ) = (￿100;￿200;200;100), which is consistent with
(Fs;Fu) = (￿400;400). The redistribution from the high wage region to the low-wage regions is not needed for
efﬁciency, i.e. correcting the "ﬁscal residua" that Buchanan emphasized, but only to satisfy Buchanan’s rule.
The supporting statement by Boadway and Flatters (1982, pp. 629-30), translated in the notation here uses the same





w = ￿, with total personal income termed PIj = wj + I + R
Suppose, for instance, that both provinces levied the same personal tax rates (￿1 = ￿2
0
). The




) and would represent the
difference in per capita public sector beneﬁts arising solely from differences in residence-based tax
bases. Notice that the NFB difference is identical over all income groups. Therefore the equalization
program that is called for on efﬁciency grounds is one that fully equalizes per capita revenues from both
source-based taxes and residence-based taxes.









(￿150;￿150;150;150), which is consistent with (Fs;Fu) = (￿450;450). However, it cannot apply to more than
2 regions. Mieszkowski and Musgrave (1999) explore how Buchanan’s criterion produces smaller cross-provincial
transfers than Boadway and Flatters’.
112.4 Grants to Local Governments Instead of Households
The framework above assumes that federal grants are made to households, when they are actually
made to local governments. Such transfers are necessarily coarser, and ﬁltered through another
decision-making body. This makes it more difﬁcult for grants to accomplish the goals that they
would in the traditional framework. First, it becomes difﬁcult to correct for type-speciﬁc differ-
ences in federal-tax burdens when regional wage differentials vary by household type. Second,
interregional grants are coarse instruments for redistributing income, as local governments are not
required to spend additional funds disproportionately on their poorest residents. Perhaps more
importantly, if local governments redistribute federal grants in equal-sized payments, they do not
eliminate ﬁscal residua, T j
e ￿p
j
GGj=Nj (Musgrave 1961). Eliminating these residua with one grant
per region seems unlikely as the possible number of ﬁscal residua is J ￿ E.
According to Bradford and Oates (1971a, 1971b), the local political process my cause federal
grants to lower local tax rates as they reduce the need for local revenues. Such a process redistrib-
utes grants according to each household’s local tax share. Lowering tax rates shrink ﬁscal residua,
but may also breaks the link between local taxes and public expenditures. To illustrate, suppose
local governments use only linear taxes. Then, federal grants can reduce ﬁscal residua, simply by
lowering local tax rates in (6). But once the size of these grants exceeds the expenditures in the
lowest-spending area, driving taxes rates there to zero, complications arise. If tax rates must be
non-negative, then as grants increase and more localities levy no taxes, areas with higher public
expenditures will receive greater federal payments, distorting location decisions towards those ar-
eas. If public expenditures are limited to be equal, then provision levels will not match local tastes,
as idealized by the Samuelson rule (2), undermining a core beneﬁt of federalism.15
15If local tax rates can be negative, then large uniform lump-sum grants could cause local governments to pay out
subsidies proportional to resident incomes, creating distortionary ﬁscal residuaa that beneﬁt the rich relative to the
poor. This seems strange, since lump-sum payments would not be distortionary. But then there is a question of why
local governments do not resort to using efﬁcient lump-sum taxes without federal grants.
123 Equity Criteria
The location-independent transfers, Fe, in the efﬁcient transfer formula (5) imply that equity goals
are compatible with efﬁciency goals, so long as equitable transfers are based on household char-
acteristics other than location. Deciding what types of transfers are equitable involves contestable
normative judgments. Keeping with the previous literature, I propose criteria based on measures of
income, but which take into account how income depends on location choices. The ﬁrst criterion,
based on earnings potential, is fully consistent with the assumption that households are mobile and
that observed data reﬂect equilibrium outcomes. The second criterion, based on realized incomes
adjusted for cost-of-living, may apply out of equilibrium.
3.1 Earnings Potential
When households are mobile, equalization policy may aim to direct funds towards households
who have relatively low incomes regardless of where they live. Such a policy would depend on
earnings potential, which depends on household characteristics. For instance, inside of any region,
less-educated and minority groups earn less than others, on average. Potential income differs
from realized income, which depends on the workplace. In equilibrium, areas with low private
productivity offer lower nominal wages, but these are offset by lower costs-of-living, so that real
incomes are unaffected. Areas where real-wage levels are low compensate households with a
greater quality-of-life or more efﬁcient public services.
Buchanan’s (1950) criterion for horizontal equity treats two households with the same nominal
incomes in different regions as equals: instead, the earnings-potential criterion treats the two as
equals if they earn the same income in the same region. This is consistent with the above frame-
work, since two households of the same type e, have the same potential income. Earnings potential
also provides a criterion for vertical equity. It suggests a single metric for comparing households
who differ in race, education or other characteristics, depending on how each affects earnings.
Some characteristics may be purposefully excluded. Measuring potential income raises practical
13issues in applications, since the earnings process may depend on unobservable characteristics and
may differ by region because of comparative advantage.
There is also the question of how potential earnings across households should be aggregated.
One candidate is to use the average, since this measures overall per-capita buying power. A dol-
lar difference in average earnings potential may be compensated for by up to a dollar in higher
transfers, depending on the redistributive preferences of society. Transferring more than a dollar is
harder to justify, as the receiving area would then have a higher per capita post-transfer income.
3.2 Realized Income Adjusted for Local Costs
This second criterion treats households as equal if their realized incomes adjusted for local costs,
pj, are equal. When labor markets are in equilibrium, low real incomes in an area either measure
low earnings potential or above-average quality of life or public productivity. But, when markets
are in disequilibrium, they may signal an oversupply of labor unrelieved by emigration because of
moving costs or other frictions. In this case, real-income differences may not be compensated by
local beneﬁts. It may then be equitable to provide transfers towards areas where real incomes are
low, since low households consumption levels reﬂect lower levels of welfare.
Transfers towards areas with low real incomes may improve the welfare of residents in the
short-run, but distort long-run incentives for labor to move to where it is in greatest demand.
Grants of this kind may perpetuate the real-income differences they ultimately seek to eliminate.
3.3 Categorical Equity
While it is inefﬁcient to direct funds towards areas where public services are costlier, such a prac-
tice may help to secure greater equity in important categories of consumption, known as "categor-
ical equity" (Tobin 1970). This assumes that local governments will indeed provide these services.
Furthermore, it suggests that public categories of consumption, e.g., for schools and sewers, are
more basic than private ones, e.g., for food, clothing, and shelter.
144 EstimatingtheNetFiscalBeneﬁtsofResidenceacrossProvinces
As seen in section 2.2, differences in NFB distort migration decisions. In practice, the components
of NFB differences are hard to measure, especially at the household level. Accordingly, in the


























to create the average measurable NFB of province j, \ NFB
j
. In per-capita terms, this measures
federal-grant receipts, minus federal-tax payments, plus local source-based revenues. It is nor-
malized it to have a population average of zero. According to the right-hand side of (8), ﬁscal
equalization policy that improves efﬁciency should make \ NFB
j
positively related to local gov-
ernment expenditures if ￿ < 1, or other un-modeled externalities. Fiscal equalization policy that
improves equity should make \ NFB
j
positively related with the criteria discussed in section 3.
I apply this model to Canada using 2001 data on individuals from the Census and on provinces
from CANSIM. These data measure the three components of \ NFB
j
, reported in Table 1, as well
as candidate measures of public-good externalities and ﬁscal need, reported in Table 2.16
Although incomplete, the theoretical model seems realistic enough to shed light on whether an
existing federal grant system is efﬁcient and equitable, provided the main assumptions hold. In
particular, differences in NFB must be sufﬁciently stable for the static framework, giving house-
holds a long window over which they may be mobile. These assumptions should apply to Canada,
where inter-provincial mobility is quite high (e.g. Bernard et al. 2008), and measurable NFBs
show considerable persistence over time, as seen in Figure 3 below.
16This model can also be applied in other countries. In the United States, Alaska may offer the highest measurable
NFB across states. In the year 2000, Alaska received federal grants of $3,619 per capita, or $2,582 above average,
while its federal-tax burden was only $259 above average. To this should be added source-based revenues: per-
capita revenues from oil and gas were $7,670, of which $1,964 was paid directly to residents through the Alaska
Permanent Fund. While I do not have data on source-based revenues in the rest of the United States, they are certainly
much smaller per capita. Alaska has no state sales or personal income tax, and yet had combined state and local
expenditures of $13,762 per capita, relative to a national average of $6,208. Per-capita personal income in Alaska was
$30,558 compared to $30,399 nationally.
154.1 Equalization and other Federal Grants
Federal grant differences across provinces stem mostly from explicit ﬁscal equalization payments,
which are unconditional block grants. These payments are calculated from a Representative Tax














where k indicates a tax base, B
j
k is the quantity of the tax base in province j, ￿ Bk is the population-




k measures the ﬁscal capacity of province j, while
P
k ￿ ￿k ￿ Bk is the national standard to
which it is compared. The asymmetry of the formula beneﬁts provinces with ﬁscal capacities
that are below average, but does not penalize those with capacities above average. Equalization
payments from this system in 2001 amounted to C$14.2B (billion), or 1.4 percent of GDP. Other
grant differences arise through small (and since disappeared) asymmetries in the Canadian Health
and Social Transfer, a system of block grants worth C$34.9B, and other federal grants, worth
C$3.5B. As shown in Appendix Table 1, grant differences outside equalization are fairly small.17
Column 1 of Table 1 reports the per-capita distribution of federal grants across areas, averaging
over 1999 to 2003 to smooth out any temporary variations. Together, residents of Ontario, Alberta,
and British Columbia receive C$378 less than average; Manitoba and Saskatchewan, C$863 more
than average; the Atlantic provinces, C$1,503 more; and the Territories, C$15,561 more. Quebec,
sometimes depicted as equalization’s greatest beneﬁciary, receives just C$32 more than average.
17According to the Canadian Constitution
“Parliament and the government of Canada are committed to the principle of making equalization
payments to ensure that provincial governments have sufﬁcient revenues to provide reasonably com-
parable levels of public services at reasonably comparable levels of taxation.” (Subsection 36(2) of the
Constitution Act, 1982)
Because of its asymmetry, the formula in (9) does not guarantee this Constitutional goal, which differs signiﬁcantly
from the goal of economic efﬁciency.
164.2 Local Wage Levels and Federal-Tax Burdens
To calculate differences in federal-tax burdens across provinces, I ﬁrst estimate wage-levels across
provinces, controlling for labor-force characteristics. These wage-levels are supposed to give the
causal effect of location on wages, which determine federal-tax burdens. For this exercise, I take
full-time workers, ages 25 to 55, from the 2001 Census, based on a 2.7 percent public-use sample
of Canadians. I estimate wage differences, W, with the regression equation
w
ij




e is the logarithm of wages of individual i in province j, Xe is a vector of characteristics
for type e , and ￿j are provincial indicators. The characteristics divide into three categories: (i)
standard human-capital, i.e., education (including ﬁeld of study) and experience; (ii) minority
characteristics, related to immigration, language, and ethnicity; and (iii) industry and occupation.
Appendix B catalogues these variables in detail, which I fully interact with gender. Identiﬁcation
using least-squares regression requires that the idiosyncratic error term, "ij, obeys E("ijjXe;￿j) =
0.18
Average wages in a province, ￿ wj, decompose into the sum ￿ wj = ￿j + ￿ Xj￿, where ￿j is




eXe. I normalize these components to have a national average of zero. Figure 1a
graphs the estimated composition effects ￿ Xj ^ ￿ against the estimated raw-wage differences, ^ wj:
The distance between the markers and the diagonal line measures the estimated local-wage levels,
^ ￿j: Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 report these components in dollar terms; column 3 reports predicted
wages due only to minority characteristics. I report detailed decompositions in Table A2.19
18The regression equation implies that compensating wage differentials across provinces are multiplicatively uni-
form across types, eliminating comparative advantage. Thus, two individuals who have the same predicted wage in one
province have the same predicted wage in another. This appears to be fairly accurate: I have estimated ￿ coefﬁcients
separately in different provinces and found them to be very similar.
19These estimates exclude wage differences due to industry and occupation under the assumption that they capture
compensating differentials. Results including industry and occupation do not differ much from the results reported
here, and are available from the author.
17The local-wage level estimates, ^ ￿j; are large and signiﬁcant. Ontario and British Columbia
offer a 6 percent premium over the average, while Alberta and Quebec offer wages just below.
The remaining six provinces have considerably lower wage levels. In comparison, the composition
effects, ￿ Xj ^ ￿, are small : workers seem not to sort across provinces according to their overall
observable skill levels. Workers in Ontario and British Columbia are better educated, but are also
morelikelytobelower-paidimmigrantsandminorities. TheoppositeistrueofthoseintheAtlantic
and Prairie provinces. Interestingly, the coefﬁcient from a regression of composition on raw-wage
differences in Figure 1 is -0.12 (s.e. = 0.03). Thus, workers in higher-paying provinces have lower-
paying characteristics, which is interesting since ￿ Xj ^ ￿ measures average earnings potential.20
I estimate federal-tax differentials from local wage levels using an effective marginal federal-
tax rate of 24.1 percent. This rate accounts for federal income taxes and the General Sales Tax.21
In column 2 of Table 1, I report the estimated federal-tax savings, or "deﬁcit", of moving into a
province using this calculation.
4.3 Source-Based Tax Revenues
Some judgment is needed to determine what provincial tax revenues are truly source-based. The
main criterion is that these revenues do not provide signiﬁcant beneﬁts to the factors they are levied
on. Instead, source-based revenues beneﬁt local residents, who do not pay them. In the available
sources from CANSIM, four categories of revenues appear to be largely source-based. First, are
provincialcorporateincometaxes, worthC$14.3Bin2001, whichItakeastaxesoncapital. Second
and third are "mining and logging taxes" and "natural resource taxes and licenses," worth C$1.1B
together, which are from land-based natural resources. Most tax revenues from natural resources,
20Identiﬁcation of ￿j requires that workers do not sort across provinces according to unobserved characteristics that
affect wages. To test this possibility, I compare the location effects for workers currently in their province of birth –
69 percent of the sample – against location effects for the entire sample. The estimated location effects are virtually
identical suggesting that sorting across provinces does not severely bias the estimates.
21Direct taxes are measured in CANSIM matrix 354-0006, excluding the General Sales Tax. These data imply larger
estimates of federal tax differences across provinces that are strongly correlated with the ones the more conservatie
estimates used here. Modeling progressive changes in federal tax rates would also increase the differentials, but by
only a small amount. Using larger tax differentials would only reinforce the conclusions made in this paper.
18mainly from royalties, fall under CANSIM’s vaguely-named category of "investment income,"
worth C$28.0B. On average, source-based revenues comprise about 20 percent of provincial own
revenues, albeit 37 percent of Alberta’s.22
Differentials averaged over 1999 to 2003 are reported in column 3 of Table 1, with all of the
sub-components listed in Table A3, together with other provincial revenues. Alberta offers the
most in source-based revenues: C$2081 more than the national average. Saskatchewan, British
Columbia and Manitoba are also above average, while the other provinces are below.
4.4 The Distribution of Net Fiscal Beneﬁts.
Column 4 of Table 1 adds up the measurable NFB for residing in different provinces. These are
seen in Figure 2, which plots federal grant levels against source-based revenues added to federal-
tax deﬁcits. A province’s NFB is equal to the distance between its marker and the solid downward-
sloping line that delineates the grants necessary to make measurable NFB zero. Here, we see the
provinces cluster into three groups. Ontario has the lowest NFB, at C$1,083 per capita below
average. Next are British Columbia and Quebec, with beneﬁts C$186 below average. In the
remaining provinces, the NFB are quite positive, averaging C$1,766. Furthermore, we see that
equalization policy does not offset the ﬁscal beneﬁts from source-based revenues and federal-tax
deﬁcits. The positive slope of the regression line suggests the policy slightly exacerbates them.
Finally, in Figure 3, we see that differences in measurable NFB across the provinces are fairly
stable around the time period considered here. According to ﬁgures in Courchene and Beavis
(1973), these differences have persisted since the 1960s.
22The distinction between source-based and destination-based taxes is imperfect in the data. The main distinction
is whether those taxes are compensated for by local beneﬁts. For instance, consumption taxes are source-based to the
when they are paid by visitors from outside the province. The majority of consumption taxes are paid for by residents;
arguably, revenues paid by non-residents may pay for services, such as infrastructure, that they use.
195 Are Differences in Measurable Net Fiscal Beneﬁts Justiﬁed?
Differences in federal grants or NFB may be justiﬁed if they help to reduce regional inequities or
correct for externalities. In Canada, these inequities or externalities need to be large to justify the
measured differences. Regression results in panels B and C, column 1, of Table 2, imply that a
worker who moves to raise her wage level by one dollar expects to see a 73-cent drop in NFB,
including a 43-cent drop in federal grants, so that her net wage rises by only 27 cents. Thus, the
current system seriously dulls the incentive to move to where labor productivity is high.
5.1 Equity
The ﬁrst equity criterion requires that grants or NFB be directed towards areas with low average
earnings potential. These averages, already discussed in section 4.2, are reported in columns 2 and
3 of Table 2.23 Using these measures requires that the empirical model (10) is correctly speciﬁed
and identiﬁed: hopefully, it is accurate enough. Regression results in panels B and C indicate that
provinces with higher potential earnings receive more in grants and measurable NFB, contrary
to what seems equitable. The positive relationship in column 3 implies that beneﬁts are directed
towardsprovinceswithmoreEnglish-speakingnativewhites, awayfromlower-earningimmigrants
and minorities.24
The second equity criterion requires that grants or NFB be directed towards areas with low
realized real incomes. Income must be deﬂated by a local cost-of-living index, which I compute
from local housing-cost differences – following Albouy, Leibovici, and Warman (2012) – seen in
column 2 of Table 3. Local costs are high in British Columbia and Ontario, and low in the Atlantic
and Prairie provinces. Column 4 reports the resulting real-income differences, which according to
Panels B and C, are positively related to grants and NFB, again contrary to what seems equitable.
The ﬁrst equity criterion is more applicable than the second when labor markets are in equi-
23Sample selection problems are avoided by including the predicted earnings of non-workers.
24One caveat to this observation is that transfers are directed disproportionately to provinces with more aboroginals,
but this is a small portion of the population of any province.Manitoba has the highest portion of 13 percent.
20librium. In a typical disequilibrium setting, real income levels should be positively related with
population growth rates, as high real wages attract workers. Instead, the opposite is true: the cor-
relation between growth rates and real incomes (controlling for characteristics) is -0.81. Migrating
to Ontario and British Columbia is strong in spite of their low real wages, possibly because of their
amenities. Yet, as seen in column 5, a 1-percent increase in the growth rate is associated with a
C$70 decrease in federal grants.
As for categorical equity, costs are not an explicit factor in Canada’s equalization formula –
unlike Australia’s – but they may be thought to justify it implicitly. Empirically, it appears that
public-service costs are lower in ﬁscally advantaged provinces. As seen in Figure 4, Wage-levels
in education, health, and public administration – mainly public services – are similar to wage levels
in other sectors. Following the results in column 1, ﬁscal beneﬁts are directed towards areas where
public labor costs are lower. Costs may also increase in the area of land that needs to be serviced,
say for roads. Provinces with a low population density may be at a ﬁscal disadvantage as they have
fewer people to pay for their land. As seen in column 7, this explanation does not appear to apply
as ﬁscal beneﬁts favor provinces with higher density, particularly in the Atlantic.
Equalization payments are directed towards areas where households have high potential earn-
ings, encouraging them to stay despite declining populations, low nominal wages, low costs, and
high real wages, all of which suggest low productivity and quality-of-life.
5.2 Local Public-Good Externalities
The only externality modeled arises from local public-good externalities, represented by (1 ￿
￿)p
j
GGj=Nj: In a ﬁrst-best world, where Gj is provided efﬁciently, estimating this externality re-
quires knowing total local public expenditures and the congestion parameter, ￿, which as discussed
above is likely small. Combined provincial and sub-provincial public expenditures per capita are
reported in column 6 in Table 2. Here we see that expenditures are particularly high in Quebec,
and generally high in the Western provinces. Expenditure levels do exhibit a slightly positive, but
insigniﬁcant, relationship with transfers and measurable NFBs. This evidence turns negative if ex-
21penditures are adjusted to account for how they may be increased by NFB differences.25 Overall,
the evidence that equalization corrects for public-good externalities is weak.26
6 Simulated Effects of Inefﬁcient Equalization Policy
As seen above, differences in measurable NFB across provinces are persistent and do not appear to
improve equity or correct for externalities. It seems appropriate to treat a province’s advantage in
NFB as a locational subsidy, raising the demand to live in that province. Consequently, ﬁscally ad-
vantaged provinces are not only overpopulated relative to efﬁcient levels, but should have inﬂated
land and housing costs, and possibly depressed wage levels.
The theoretical model can predict the effects of NFB differences relative to a long-run equi-
librium where NFB differences are zero. As migration happens slowly, these effects should take
25These effects may be particularly important if there are "ﬂypaper effects" (Hines and Thaler, 1995). In a previous
version, I correct for endogenous spending effects by subtracting from local expenditures its measurable NFB times a
coefﬁcient of 0.36, the share of income spent on local and provincial public services. The relationship is signiﬁcantly
negative, suggesting beneﬁts are directed towards areas with smaller public-good externalities.
26Other reasons, yet to be considered, may justify current equalization policy. In a dynamic setting, federal transfers
may stabilize local revenue differences over time: provinces may mutually insure each other through economic swings,
reducing inefﬁciencies due to volatile consumption and mobility. Boadway and Hayashi (2004) ﬁnd that variation in
transfer payments over time appears to have the opposite effect of making provincial revenues less stable over time.
The framework above also ignores externalities from urban agglomeration and congestion. Incorporating them
would require quantifying their relative magnitudes across provinces, which is difﬁcult with our current knowledge.
Qualitatively, some would argue that Canada’s larger cities – Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver – are inefﬁciently
overcrowded, and hence it is efﬁcient for their provinces to pay others to stay away. This view conﬂicts partly with the
fact that nominal wages in these cities are high, while real wages are low, implying that these cities have high levels
of productivity and quality-of-life – see Albouy, Leibovici, and Warman (2012). Albouy and Seegert (2010) argue
that residents of the best cities may wish to pay others to live in less desirable areas, but that such a policy may be
inefﬁcient federally. Moreover, the provinces contain many uninhabited areas outside of the metropolitan areas that
can population.
Another justiﬁcation is that equalization policy promotes residence in remote areas, which provides direct public
beneﬁts. Yet, the market is likely to provide most of the necessary incentives to procure such beneﬁts, such as for
resource extraction. Among beneﬁts that may have national externalities, e.g., through defense, transportation, or
preservation, most would be best procured through direct federal purchases: e.g., opening military bases, building
roads, or hiring rangers. Giving a broad subsidy to live in a remote region is a very blunt policy instrument. Further-
more, there may be national beneﬁts from not occupying remote areas, such as in helping preserve wilderness areas.
Whatever the case, equalization policy, outside of the Territories, does not promote residence in provinces with fewer
residents per square kilometer.
Equalization could also promote federal unity. Provinces that beneﬁt from unity may pay those who beneﬁt less,
and raise aggregate welfare through greater economies of scale (Alesina and Spolaore 1997). This is a debatable point,
especially since the least-attached province, Quebec, gains little from equalization. Ultimately, it is difﬁcult to provide
a strong compelling economic justiﬁcation to merit such large NFB differences across provinces.
22decades to occur. But, as equalization has been persistent for several decades, it is reasonable to
think that current prices and populations levels already reﬂect these effects. I simulate the effects
here assuming ￿ = 1 and that households can be aggregated into a single type. This allows me to
apply the methods in Albouy (2009a), where higher taxes are a disamenity to households; here I
treat measurable NFB symmetrically as an amenity.
As derived in Appendix A.6, the percent effects of ﬁscal distortions on land rents, wage levels,


































sR and sw are the average shares of income received from land and labor, sy is the share of ex-
penditures on housing, ￿N and ￿L are the shares of labor and urban land used to produce tradable
private goods, and dNFBj=￿ m is the differential net beneﬁt in province j, divided by average
income. These parameters are calibrated using the values sR = 0:10, sw = 0:70, sy = 0:33,
￿L = 0:17, and ￿N = 0:70, following Albouy, Leibovici, and Warman (2012).
Long-run employment effects are simulated with a reduced-form elasticity, ", which gives the
percent increase in local employment that arises from a permanent increase in NFBs equal to one





Estimates of this elasticity based on Canadian data are controversial, although Wilson (2003) gives
the most plausible number by extending the short-run estimates of Watson (1986) and Winer and
Gauthier (1983) to a long-run encompassing 50 years. His estimates imply an average elasticity
23of " = 3:23.27 These population shifts create locational inefﬁciencies, with costs as a fraction of
income given by the dead-weight-loss formula:





In the spirit of Harberger (1964) this formula captures not only the costs of distortions in the labor
market but also distortions in other factor markets, such as mobile capital.
Columns 1 through 5 of Table 3 report equilibrium wage, housing-cost, land-rent, quality-
of-life, and net-ﬁscal beneﬁt differences across provinces, ranked from most to least advantaged.
Columns 6 through 9 report the predicted effects on prices and population. Taken together, the
Atlantic and Prairie provinces have populations 31 percent, and housing-costs 21 percent, beyond
their efﬁcient levels, while their wage levels are slightly depressed. The effects for Quebec and
British Columbia are small, meaning the results would not change considerably if Quebec residents
are less mobile. Ontario is the most adversely impacted, with housing-cost and employment levels
10and14percentbelowtheirefﬁcientlevels. Insum, theresultsimplythatCanada’slessamenable
and less productive provinces contain over 2 million people who would rather move if they were
not paid to stay where they are.
The employment and deadweight loss predictions are robust to many assumptions of the model,
since they are simulated from a reduced-form parameter, which may include many un-modeled
effects. The wage effects are sensitive to the assumption that NFB accrue to households; if they
improve the productivity of ﬁrms, the effects on wages would be positive, although the effects on
prices and rents would be similar.28 The mobility of households and capital imply that local land
owners bear the ﬁnal incidence of NFB differences, raising the relative value of land in advantaged
provinces. If households are imperfectly mobile, the model predicts weaker effects on prices and
27This is obtained by regressing proportional population ﬂows between provinces, "deltm", on changes in net ﬁscal
beneﬁts between provinces, "delt77", normalized as a fraction of income. The estimate of ￿3:23 using provinces
is almost half the size of " = ￿6 that Bartik (1991) ﬁnds using metropolitan areas. As mobility responses across
provinces should be smaller than across metropolitan areas, these differences seem plausible and consistent. Of course,
symmetric treatment of federal transfers and taxes may not be fully warranted.
28If there are agglomeration effects from higher populations, the effects of NFB on wages may be positive, while
the effects on rents and housing will be larger.
24wages; households bear some of the incidence, as real wages do not completely adjusted to offset
the NFB.
The average effects of NFB on prices, wages, and employment, and the total deadweight loss
across the economy are reported in column 1 of Table 4. The deadweight loss of the locational
inefﬁciencies created by NFB differences is 0.41 percent of income per year, or roughly C$4.3
billion in 2001 dollars. Since equalization policy exacerbates differences in NFB, columns 2 and
3 present counterfactual estimates of the efﬁciency costs without them. They imply that if the only
distortion came from source-based revenues and federal taxes the deadweight loss would be 0.26
percent of income. Therefore, equalization policy increases inefﬁciency costs by 0.15 percent of
income, or 1.6 billion dollars per year, more than 10 percent of the value of equalization grants.
7 Conclusion
If the analysis here is correct, it deserves considerable thought by economists and policy-makers
interested in place-based policies in Canada and elsewhere. The theoretical analysis adds to the lit-
erature by establishing that inter-regional transfers that maximize the efﬁciency of long-run house-
hold location choices will (i) focus on source, rather than residence, -based capacities; (ii) ignore
local cost differences; (iii) separate income differences due to the location of labor from those
due to its composition; and (iv) recognize that regions with higher federal-tax burdens are less
attractive unless they receive higher federal transfers. The analysis also suggests two extensions of
Buchanan’s equity criterion: rather than deﬁning equals according to nominal income, they may
be deﬁned according to real income or potential income.
According to the criteria used here, equalization policy in Canada appears to be rather inefﬁ-
cientandsomewhatinequitable. Fiscalbeneﬁtsaretiltedtowardslessproductiveandlessamenable
provinces and seem to disadvantage minority households. Equalization policy would be more efﬁ-
cientifitredistributedsource-basedrevenuesmoreintenselyandrefundedinterregionalfederal-tax
disparities. Such reform would likely meet considerable political opposition: Evans (2005) ﬁnds
25that per-capita representation in the House of Commons is 50 percent higher for provinces that
beneﬁt from equalization relative to provinces that do not. While it may be that Canadians wish
to pay individuals to live in certain provinces for reasons not considered here, it could be that
equalization policy has more of a political basis than an economic one.
The theoretical lessons learned clearly have lessons for other countries as well. For example,
equalization systems in Australia, Scandinavia, and Japan all lower payments to areas with greater
residence-based tax capacities. Unlike the Canadian system, their systems also distribute more
to areas deemed to have higher public-service costs. Since each system has its idiosyncracies,
separate analyses are required to evaluate the efﬁciency and equity of equalization systems in other
countries, but they certainly seem to merit further study.
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The total population is distributed across the regions according to the constraint
P
j Nj = NTOT,
where, NTOT = (NTOT
1 ;:::;NTOT
E ). AssumethatcapitalisﬁxedintheeconomyatthelevelKTOT.


















1X;:::NEX) to denote the capital, land, and labor used to produce the traded
good, and Xj the amount of the traded good produced in region j. Notation for the non-traded
good and government-provided good is similar, leading to the following 3 production constraints
























































although federally, capital and land are mobile, so that local resources are simply limited by the













In addition, we may write a plethora of non-negativity constraints, the most interesting ones being
K
j ￿ 0, N
j ￿ 0
ifor each j. Finally there are two consumption constraints, a global one for the tradable goods, and

















where xF and yjF are goods appropriated by the federal government to produce GF, a process
which does not require modeling.
A.2 Pareto Efﬁcient Allocations under Perfect Mobility
Pareto efﬁcient allocations are solved for using a planner’s problem under the constraint of perfect
mobility. The perfect mobility case corresponds best with the market economy over the very long
run, and avoids problems of redistribution within types across different regions. With multiple
types, we maximize the utility of one type in a single region, chosen arbitrarily, and guarantee that
all others of that type in other regions get the same utility, so that there are no moves. Furthermore,
we assign each other type an arbitrary level of utility regardless of where they live, combining the








































































for all j and each e.
Combining as many constraints as possible, and leaving out the non-negativity constraints,
























































































































































The necessary conditions for a solution are characterized by a large number of ﬁrst-order









































which hold with equality when the related quantities are positive. For the the allocation of factors





















































Assuming all goods are produced within regions, we get the classical tangency result for private
29The ﬁrst term of the Lagrangian comes from deﬁning ￿1























































































































The equations imply that within each region, standard allocative, production, and match efﬁciency
conditions should hold.


























Ne ￿ ￿e ￿ 0
With sufﬁcient Inada conditions applied to the utility function, all regions produce both home and
government goods, with labor in each sector. Some regions may not produce tradable goods (e.g.
resort regions), but this is ignored for now since it adds little to the analysis. Positive agglomeration
spillovers may be contained in ￿
j
Ne as there is no assumption of constant returns to scale.










in any two regions j and j0 with capital. Substituting in @L=@Gj = 0, which assumes that Gj > 0
and is set efﬁciently, the equation for labor, assuming Nj
































seen in (4) above. Since the right-hand side does not depend on j the left-hand side must be equal
across all regions with Nj
e > 0. The ﬁrst term accounts for the marginal productivity of labor. The
next two terms gives the resource cost of private consumption (perfectly congestible) that goes to
residents of each region. In regions with greater quality of life or uncongested local-government
goods, these terms will be smaller, since less consumption is required to compensate residents of
type e for living in region j. The term starting with ￿ gives the degree of congestion of the public
caused by the new inhabitant, which reﬂects their resource-cost in terms of the government good:
if ￿ = 0 this term vanishes.
ivA.3 Market Equilibrium and Optimal Fiscal Grants
In the market environment, factors are perfectly mobile across sectors within region, and labor and
capital are perfectly mobile across regions. All input and goods markets are perfectly competitive,
and the government is efﬁcient and pays factors their marginal product. Take x to be the numeraire
good, with a price pX = 1, and let p
j
Y be the market price of home goods. The budget constraint



















e is the amount local taxes paid by resident e in region j. wj
e are local wages, Rj
e are
incomes from land, Ij
e are incomes from capital, and F j
e are net ﬁscal transfers, which can include
federal income taxes. All income sources are super-scripted to indicate their possible dependence
on location.























































This condition says that local tax levels, net of ﬁscal transfers, i.e. total payments to both levels of
government, should equilibrate congestion of government-good consumption, and any place-based
income differentials from land and capital income. The constant term implies that this can differ
across types but not across regions.
A.4 The Boadway-Flatters (1982a) Model





locations, only Lj. Gj is produced out of Xj, which can be simulated here by assuming that
p
j
G = 1. Production exhibits constant returns to scale in all factors, implying falling returns to
scale in N and K.
Case 1 Lump-Sum Taxes and Local Rent Sharing
In this ﬁrst case, labor is homogenous and there is no capital. Local government goods are paid
with a local uniform head tax, and residents inherit land in the location that they move to, sharing










where rj = @F
j





















foranytworegionsj andj0. Federaltransfersshouldsubsidizefederalexternalities, whichincrease
with the level of per-capita government-good provision, and completely tax away differences in
locally appropriated land rents.
Case 2 Source-Based and Residence-Based Taxes
Labor is still homogenous, but capital is reintroduced, and property is owned uniformly regard-




L, and a residence-based
tax on labor is ￿
j
N. In addition, there is a property-tax rate, ￿
j


































































where rj = @F
j








X=@NX)=Lj, by Euler’s Theorem. Be-
cause these taxes are uniform within regions, they do not distort production efﬁciency within re-
























































































viwhich is the result that ﬁscal externalities should be subsidized, and that all source-based revenues
should be redistributed.
Case 3 Worker Heterogeneity











































where Fe satisﬁes the overall federal budget constraint.























































j + ￿ R
j)N
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e. Substituting in we get
F
j































The addition here is that residents whose tax payments are below the local average should be given
less federal money; residents with above-average tax payments should receive a subsidy.





























The terms related to income from labor and property add up to zero when averaged. The grants
have to be targeted directly at the right population or they do not have the corrective effect: effec-
tively taxes on those types who are locating for ﬁscal reasons are exactly canceled out by subsidies
on those with above average incomes. The federal government can give differential grants accord-
ing to the composition of types across locations, but this is for redistributional purposes, not for
efﬁciency.
A.5 The Final Model
The case in the main text is a fairly straightforward expansion of the last model, using the assump-
tion that income from capital and land are location independent. p
j
G is assumed to equal MRT
j
Gx






G, affect the quantities and prices in the
model, but do not change the fundamental nature of the conditions. In addition, we can redeﬁne
federal grant differences ~ F j








to add back in differential
federal-tax payments, so that they then become pure federal transfers, with federal taxes accounted
for separately, and use the previously derived formulas.
A.6 Equilibrium Conditions and Foundations of the Simulated Effects
The expenditure function for a household, e(pj;Qj;w;gj;T j:u) measures the cost of consumption
needed to attain utility u, and is increasing in pj, and decreasing in wj;Qj, T j, and gj.30Since
households are fully mobile, all cities must the same utility, ￿ u. This means that ﬁrms in cities with







The unit cost of producing a tradable good is cX(rj;wj;￿ {;A
j
X) = cX(rj;wj;￿ {)=A
j
X where
c(r;w;i) ￿ c(r;w;i;1).31 A symmetric deﬁnition holds for the unit cost of a home good, cY. As
markets are competitive, ﬁrms make zero proﬁts in equilibrium. Therefore, for given output prices,
more productive cities must pay higher rents and wages to achieve zero proﬁts. In equilibrium, the












Applying the envelope theorem and Shepard’s Lemma, the differentials for these conditions
are:
y ￿ dp





j + nX ￿ dw
j = 0
lY ￿ dr
j + lY ￿ dw
j = dp
j
where lX = LX=X, lY = LY=Y , etc. This is taken be an approximation around the national


























30Formally, e(pj;u;Qj) ￿ minx;yfx + pjy : U
￿
x;y;Qj￿
￿ ug. The use of a single index Qj assumes that
amenities are weakly separable from consumption.
31cX(rj;wj;￿ {;A
j
X) ￿ minL;N;KfrjL + wjN +￿ {K : A
j
XF (L;N;K) = 1g
viiiThese lead directly to the solutions in section 6.
B Data and Estimation
I use Canadian Census data from the 2001 Public Use Microdata Files to calculate wage and
housing-cost differentials. The wage differentials are calculated for workers ages 25 to 55, who
report working at least 30 hours a week, 26 weeks a year. The CMA (Census Metropolitan Area)
assigned to a worker is determined by their place of residence, with non-CMA residents pooled by
province into a single ﬁctional CMA. The wage differential of an CMA is found by regressing log
hourly wages on individual covariates and indicators for a worker’s CMA, using the coefﬁcients on
these CMA indicators. Province-level wage levels are calculated by averaging CMA-wage effects,
weighted by population. Just using province indicators would produce fairly similar results, but
would control less for rural-urban disparities.
The covariates are split into three main categories, as mentioned in the text, which can be
further sub-categorized.
i.a 9 indicators of educational attainment, and three variables indicating highest grade, years of
university, and years of other schooling;
i.b a quartic in potential experience, and potential experience interacted with years of education;
i.c 12 indicators for major ﬁeld of study;
ii.a 13 indicators of industry (1980 deﬁnition);
ii.b 25 indicators of occupation (2001 SOC);
iii.a 4 indicators of marital status (married, divorced, widowed, separated);
iii.b 5 indicators of minority status (Black, Chinese, South Asian, Aboriginal and other);
iii.c Indicators of immigrant status, time since immigration, and citizenship status;
iii.d Indicators of mother tongue (English, French, or other) and indicators for bilingualism inter-
acted with mother tongue, and for other mother tongue interacted with speaking only French
and only English;
All covariates are interacted with gender.
ixProvince Code
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Newfoundland NL 522,033 2,117 548 -494 2,171
PEI PEI 136,663 1,856 739 -643 1,952
Nova Scotia NS 932,454 1,161 622 -542 1,241
New Brunswick NB 749,801 1,436 649 -71 2,014
Quebec QC 7,396,331 32 169 -396 -195
Ontario ON 11,896,663 -417 -244 -422 -1,083
Manitoba MB 1,151,439 1,119 415 214 1,748
Saskatchewan SK 1,000,221 570 515 716 1,801
Alberta AB 3,058,017 -343 45 2,081 1,783
British Columbia BC 4,076,264 -294 -216 339 -171
Territories Terr 99,134 15,561 -536 1,157 16,182
Measured in 2001 Canadian Dollars. Population from CANSIM Table 54-0001. Total federal
transfers from CANSIM 384-0011. Federal tax differential based on a marginal tax rate of 24.1
percent and log wage differences from table 2 using an earnings base of $16,721. Source-based
revenues the sum of corporate income taxes, mining and logging taxes, natural resources taxes and
licences, and investment income from CANSIM 385-0002. Federal transfer and source-based
revenue differentials averaged over 1998 to 2003. See text for further detail.
TABLE 1: MEASURABLE NET FISCAL BENEFITS OF RESIDING IN CANADIAN 
PROVINCES, RELATIVE TO THE NATIONAL AVERAGE: 2001















Benefit = (1) 
+ (2) + (3)Nominal Predicted Predicted Realized Population Prov. & 
Wage Level Earnings Earnings Income Adj Growth Population Local
(Location Human Cap Minority for Costs- 1991 to Density Public
Province Effect) & Minority Only of Living 2001 (per sq. km) Expenditures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Newfoundland -2,278 125 602 1,240 -10.6 1.29 652  
PEI -3,070 384 653 -665 4.7 24.15 -272  
Nova Scotia -2,584 498 535 -65 1.8 16.87 -1,108  
New Brunswick -2,693 368 704 144 0.4 10.28 -1,119  
Quebec -705 254 417 700 4.4 4.80 748  
Ontario 1,009 -145 -303 -123 13.1 11.05 -395  
Manitoba -1,718 -129 70 -2 3.6 1.78 221  
Saskatchewan -2,136 62 317 -148 -0.5 1.54 293  
Alberta -180 14 70 174 16.5 4.62 -53  
BC 905 -223 -366 -1,241 18.8 4.31 171  
Territories 2,230 -640 -319 3,672 9.9 0.03 -3,517
Coefficient -0.43 1.58 1.12 0.29 -70.1 -24.14 0.08
Std. Error (0.06) (0.65) (0.40) (0.16) (20.0) (49.21) (0.34)
Adjusted R
2  0.77 0.24 0.43 -0.02 0.59 -0.09 -0.12
Coefficient -0.73 2.25 1.83 0.31 -63.7 -133.34 0.27
Std. Error (0.15) (1.62) (0.98) (0.32) (53.4) (90.77) (0.73)
Adjusted R
2  0.55 0.07 0.26 -0.09 0.03 0.13 -0.11
Measured in 2001 Canadian Dollars. Predicted income based off of predicted wages using an income base of $21766. Local
and provincial expenditures based off of provincial and local government expenditures in CANSIM 385-0002 and 385-0003
averaging from 1999 to 2003. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions using 10 provinces, excluding territories,
weighted by population. See text for further detail.
TABLE 2: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FEDERAL GRANTS AND MEASURABLE NET FISCAL BENEFITS WITH 
EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY CRITERIA: 2001
Panel B: Regression on Federal Grants
Panel A: Measures
Panel C: Regression on  Measurable Net Fiscal BenefitsBene- Wage-Level Inferred Net Quality
fit (Location Hous. Land Fiscal of Hous. Land Employ-
Rank Province Effect) Cost Rent Benefit Life Wage Cost Rent ment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1 Newfoundland -0.15 -0.68 -2.39 0.10 -0.22 -0.03 0.24 1.01 0.33
2 New Brunswick -0.18 -0.41 -1.29 0.09 -0.11 -0.03 0.22 0.93 0.30
3 PEI -0.21 -0.41 -1.13 0.09 -0.08 -0.03 0.21 0.91 0.29
4 Saskatchewan -0.15 -0.63 -2.06 0.08 -0.19 -0.03 0.19 0.84 0.27
5 Alberta -0.01 -0.22 -0.72 0.08 -0.14 -0.03 0.19 0.81 0.26
6 Manitoba -0.11 -0.52 -1.66 0.08 -0.17 -0.03 0.19 0.80 0.26
7 Nova Scotia -0.17 -0.16 -0.39 0.06 0.01 -0.02 0.14 0.58 0.19
8 BC 0.05 0.36 1.30 -0.01 0.09 0.00 -0.02 -0.09 -0.03
9 Quebec -0.03 -0.23 -0.80 -0.01 -0.05 0.00 -0.03 -0.11 -0.04
10 Ontario 0.06 0.07 0.15 -0.05 0.03 0.02 -0.11 -0.47 -0.15
TABLE 3: RELATIVE PRICE, WAGE, QUALITY-OF-LIFE DIFFERENCES ACROSS PROVINCES AND THE 
EFFECTS OF NET FISCAL BENEFITS ON PRICES, WAGES, AND EMPLOYMENT: 2001
Predicted Long-Run Effects
of Net Fiscal Benefits
All quantities expressed in log terms except for net-fiscal-benefit and quality-of-life, each measured as a fraction of average
income. Housing-cost and gross real income measures explained in the Appendix. Quality of life is equal to 0.33 times
housing cost minus 0.70 times wages minus net fiscal benefits. Wage, housing-cost, land-rent, and employment effects
based off of model in Albouy (2009) using Canadian parameters in Albouy and Leibovici (2009) and using an elasticity of
employment with respect to transfers of 3.23 based on Wilson (2003).Total Source- Fed Taxes




Average Percent Effects (Mean Absolute Values)
Net fiscal benefit differential: E|NFB/m| 0.042 0.027 0.030
Wage effect: E|dw| 0.013 0.009 0.010
Home-good price effect: E|dp| 0.097 0.063 0.069
Land rent effect: E|dr| 0.418 0.270 0.295
Employment effect: E|dN| 0.135 0.087 0.095
Deadweight Loss from Locational Inefficiency
As a percent of income, E(DWL/Nm) 0.413% 0.212% 0.257%
Total DWL (Billions per year, 2001$) 4.3 2.2 2.7
Per Capita (per year, 2001$) 144.4 74.0 89.7
TABLE 4: ESTIMATED PRICE, EMPLOYMENT, AND WELFARE EFFECTS OF 
NET FISCAL BENEFITS, OR ITS COMPONENTS, ACROSS PROVINCES, 2001
Territories excluded. Net fiscal benefit differential measured as a fraction of average
income. Other price changes in terms of log changes. Price effects based on calibrated
model similar to Albouy (2009) Employment elasticity with respect to net fiscal benefit
based on Wilson (2003). See text for formulas and other details.Province
(1)+(2)+(3) (1) (2) (3)
Newfoundland 2117 1678 134 304  
PEI 1856 1595 127 133  
Nova Scotia 1161 1033 127 2  
New Brunswick 1436 1297 127 12  
Quebec 32 276 -199 -45  
Ontario -417 -395 25 -46  
Manitoba 1119 824 124 171  
Saskatchewan 570 -123 120 573  
Alberta -343 -393 -3 52  
BC -294 -361 153 -86  
Territories 15561 14560 -16 1017  
Measured in 2001 Canadian Dollars. Federal transfer data from CANSIM 384-
0011. Federal transfer differentials averaged over 1998 to 2003. See text for
further detail.
TABLE A1: DECOMPOSITION OF FEDERAL TRANSFER DIFFERENCES 













Newfoundland -0.148 (0.010) -0.173 (0.010) -0.026 (0.004) -0.054 (0.003) -0.033 (0.004) 0.011 (0.003)
PEI -0.202 (0.016) -0.231 (0.039) -0.022 (0.002) -0.041 (0.003) -0.046 (0.002) 0.014 (0.003)
Nova Scotia -0.146 (0.007) -0.195 (0.019) -0.002 (0.003) -0.027 (0.003) -0.032 (0.003) 0.007 (0.003)
New Brunswick -0.164 (0.007) -0.203 (0.020) -0.012 (0.003) -0.045 (0.003) -0.035 (0.003) 0.017 (0.003)
Quebec -0.026 (0.004) -0.067 (0.014) -0.010 (0.003) -0.035 (0.003) -0.026 (0.003) 0.000 (0.003)
Ontario 0.063 (0.003) 0.037 (0.013) -0.025 (0.003) -0.016 (0.003) -0.016 (0.003) -0.044 (0.003)
Manitoba -0.132 (0.006) -0.134 (0.018) -0.048 (0.003) -0.038 (0.003) -0.040 (0.003) -0.021 (0.003)
Saskatchewan -0.178 (0.007) -0.163 (0.021) -0.066 (0.003) -0.041 (0.003) -0.070 (0.003) -0.006 (0.003)
Alberta -0.005 (0.004) -0.034 (0.015) -0.021 (0.003) -0.029 (0.003) -0.022 (0.003) -0.021 (0.003)
BC 0.031 (0.004) 0.031 (0.014) -0.050 (0.003) -0.017 (0.003) -0.036 (0.003) -0.048 (0.003)
Territories 0.139 (0.020) 0.105 (0.042) -0.017 (0.004) -0.047 (0.003) 0.025 (0.002) -0.045 (0.005)
TABLE A2: WAGE DIFFERENCES ACROSS PROVINCES: COMPOSITION AND LOCATION EFFECTS, 2001


















Robust standard errors in parentheses. Wage data are taken from the Census 2001 PUMFI. Wage estimates are based on the average
logarithm of hourly wages for full-time workers ages 25 to 55. Education: highest grade, years of univeristy, other years, 9 indicators of
highest degree, and 12 field of study indicators. Experience: quartic in potential experience and experience interacted with years of
schooling. Industry: 13 indicators; occupation: 25 indicators. Immigration, time since immigration, citizenship status, visible minority
indicators interacted immigration status, mother tongue interacted with official languages spoken. Composition effects based on all
individual ages 25 to 55, regardless of employment. Further detail provided in the Data Appendix.
(3) (4) (5) (6) (1)Province
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (12)
Panel A: Differential across Provinces relative to National Average
Newfoundland -1233 -494 -263 9 -11 -229 -690 -513 172 -251 -97 -48 -1020
PEI -1207 -643 -222 -11 -16 -393 -539 -575 205 70 -238 -31 -1182
Nova Scotia -1411 -542 -206 -10 -16 -310 -811 -340 23 -204 -290 -59 -580
New Brunswick -988 -71 -207 -6 -8 150 -725 -503 -70 127 -279 -194 -889
Quebec 577 -396 -76 -4 -8 -308 962 599 17 -21 367 12 -132
Ontario -476 -422 112 -6 -16 -511 -12 -83 157 -93 6 -41 393
Manitoba -218 214 -150 3 -9 369 -172 -161 15 37 -64 -260 -200
Saskatchewan 408 716 -186 113 125 665 -256 -331 179 57 -161 -52 50
Alberta 1215 2081 180 -11 70 1843 -1025 -153 -721 110 -261 159 18
BC 104 339 -142 8 -12 484 -355 -336 5 262 -286 120 -401
Territories -528 1157 1360 -11 -14 -178 -1856 -507 -888 -169 -293 157 -322
Panel B: As a Percentage of Provincial Own-Revenue
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Provincial Own-Revenue Componennts
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Raw Wage Differential
Linear Fit, slope = -0.12 (s.e. =  0.04) 





















































































Source-Based Revenues minus Federal Tax Differential
Offset Line: Measurable NFB = 0
Reg. Line, slope =  0.15 (s.e. =  0.24) 
Figure 2: Per-Capita Federal Grants Relative to
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Provincial Wage Level: All Workers
Linear Fit, slope =  0.64 (s.e. =  0.07) 





















































n Figure 4: Local Wage Levels for Public Service Workers